Justin’s Notes

Ideological Infection Doesn't Respect the Natural/Social Science Border

2026-09-13 · AI-generated insight

McIntyre's diagnosis of the social sciences rests on an implicit contrast: the natural sciences broke with their "barbarous past" and became reliable, while the social sciences remain plagued by ideological infection, fuzzy concepts, and questionable inference. Lewontin's famous argument about race complicates that contrast — because it exhibits several items on McIntyre's list, despite coming from population genetics, one of the most quantitative corners of natural science.

Notice the structure of Lewontin's final move. The empirical finding — most genetic variation lies within groups rather than between them — is genuine. But the conclusion smuggles in a normative premise: racial classification is "positively destructive of social and human relations," therefore "no justification can be offered for its continuance." That is exactly what McIntyre means by ideological infection: knowing in advance what one wants to find, and letting the desired social conclusion shape how the empirical result gets framed. Lewontin was unusually candid about it — the social judgment appears right in the text — but candor doesn't make the inference cleaner.

There's also a version of McIntyre's "fuzzy concepts" problem here. Lewontin uses single-locus variance as a proxy for taxonomic significance, but the filing under Correlation Across Many Variables points at the standard rejoinder (Edwards's critique): populations that overlap heavily on any one variable can still be reliably distinguished when many weakly-informative variables are considered jointly. Whether the proxy captures what we actually care about is precisely the kind of question McIntyre says social scientists fail to ask about "warmth" and "trustworthiness."

The synthesis: the pathologies McIntyre catalogs may not track the natural/social science boundary at all. They track proximity to political stakes. Genetics is methodologically mature, but the moment it touches race, it starts behaving like McIntyre's social science — favored conclusions, contested proxies, motivated framing. This suggests the social sciences' problem isn't that they lack the scientific method; it's that nearly everything they study is politically charged, so they operate permanently in the zone where even physics-envy-proof disciplines wobble. Medicine's escape from barbarism may be a misleading model: it matured partly because most of its questions stopped being political. The social sciences may never get that luxury.

Woven from these notes

When so many studies fail to be replicated, or draw different conclusions from the same set of facts, it does not instill confidence in the social sciences. Whether this is because of sloppy methodology, ideological infection, or other problems, the result is that even if there are right and wrong answers to many of our questions about human action, most social scientists are not yet in a position to find them. It is not that none of the work in social science is rigorous enough, but when policymakers (and sometimes even other researchers) are not sure which results are reliable, it drives down the status of the entire field. If medicine could break with its barbarous past, isn’t the same path open to the social sciences? For years, many have argued that if they could emulate the “scientific method” of the natural sciences, they too could become more scientific. But this simple advice faces several problems. Among the issues that plague contemporary social scientific research: Too much theory: A number of social scientific studies propose answers that have not been tested against evidence. The classic example here is neoclassical economics, where a number of simplifying assumptions — perfect rationality, perfect information — resulted in beautiful quantitative models that had little to do with actual human behavior. Lack of experimentation/data: Except for social psychology and the newly emerging field of behavioral economics, much of social science still does not rely on experimentation, even where it is possible. For example, it is sometimes offered as justification for putting sex offenders on a public database that doing so reduces the recidivism rate. This must be measured, though, against what the recidivism rate would have been absent the Sex Offender Registry Board (SORB), which is difficult to measure and has produced varying answers. This exacerbates the difficulty in (1), whereby favored theoretical explanations are accepted even when they have not been tested against any experimental evidence. Fuzzy concepts: Some social scientific studies can lead to misleading conclusions because of the use of “proxy” concepts for what one really wishes to measure. A recent example includes measuring “warmth” as a proxy for “trustworthiness,” in which researchers assumed — on the basis of studies which show that we are more likely to trust someone whom we perceive to be “on our side” — that perceptions of scientists as “cold” meant that they would be less trustworthy as well. But the two concepts may not be interchangeable. Ideological infection: This problem is rampant throughout the social sciences, especially on topics that are politically charged. Two ongoing examples are the bastardization of empirical work on the deterrence effect of capital punishment and the effectiveness of gun control on mitigating crime. If one knows in advance what one wants to find, one will likely find it. Cherry picking: The use of statistics allows multiple “degrees of freedom” to scientific researchers, but this is the most likely to be abused. In studies on immigration, for instance, a great deal of the difference between them is a result of alternative ways of counting the “costs” incurred by immigration. This is obviously also related to (4) above. If we know our conclusion, we may shop for the data to support it. Lack of data sharing: As the evolutionary biologist Robert Trivers reports in Psychology Today, there are numerous documented cases of researchers failing to share their data in psychological studies, despite a requirement from APA-sponsored journals to do so. When data were later analyzed, errors were found most commonly in the direction of the researcher’s hypothesis. Lack of replication: Psychology is undergoing a reproducibility crisis. One might validly argue that the initial finding that nearly two-thirds of psychology studies were irreproducible was overblown, but it is nonetheless shocking that most studies are not even attempted to be replicated. This can lead to difficulties, where errors can sneak through. Questionable causation: It is gospel in statistical research that “correlation does not equal causation,” yet some social scientific studies continue to highlight provocative results of questionable value. One recent sociological study, for instance, found that matriculating at a selective college was correlated with parental visitation at art museums, without explicitly suggesting that this was likely an artifact of parental income.
— Lee McIntyre To Fix the Social Sciences, Look to the “Dark Ages” of Medicine
It is clear that our perception of relatively large differences between human races and subgroups, as compared to the variation within these groups, is indeed a biased perception and that, based on randomly chosen genetic differences, human races and populations are remarkably similar to each other, with the largest part by far of human variation being accounted for by the differences between individuals. Human racial classification is of no social value and is positively destructive of social and human relations. Since such racial classification is now seen to be of virtually no genetic or taxonomic significance either, no justification can be offered for its continuance.
— Lewontin