Justin’s Notes

Race Science as the Stress Test for McIntyre's Checklist

2026-09-06 · AI-generated insight

McIntyre offers a diagnostic checklist for what ails the social sciences — ideological infection, fuzzy proxy concepts, cherry-picked data. Winegard and Carl, perhaps unintentionally, provide the single most contested arena in which to run that diagnostic: the biology of race. The pairing is revealing because race science is where every item on McIntyre's list fires simultaneously, on both sides of the debate.

Consider the fuzzy-concept problem. Winegard and Carl's account is deliberately modest — isolated populations under divergent selection pressures will drift apart genetically. That claim is nearly uncontroversial among geneticists. The trouble begins when the word "race" gets attached to it, because the folk concept of race and the population-genetic concept of ancestral clusters are exactly the kind of proxy pair McIntyre warns about — related, overlapping, but not interchangeable, like "warmth" and "trustworthiness." Whether continental ancestry groups vindicate or merely gesture at everyday racial categories is the entire fight, and it is a conceptual fight masquerading as an empirical one.

The deeper irony is that ideological infection cuts symmetrically here. McIntyre's warning — "if one knows in advance what one wants to find, one will likely find it" — is standardly deployed against race scientists. But it applies with equal force to researchers motivated to find that race is nothing but a social construct. A field that cannot distinguish reliable results from motivated ones, as McIntyre notes, loses the authority to adjudicate precisely the questions where authority matters most. Race science thus isn't just another example of social science's troubles; it's the case where the cost of methodological immaturity is highest, because the vacuum left by unreliable science gets filled by whoever argues most confidently.

McIntyre's hopeful analogy — medicine escaped its dark ages, so social science can too — meets its hardest test here. Medicine matured partly by settling on concepts (pathogens, lesions) that carved nature cleanly. The race debate suggests social science's dark age may persist not for lack of rigor, but because its most charged questions are built on concepts that resist clean carving.

Woven from these notes

When so many studies fail to be replicated, or draw different conclusions from the same set of facts, it does not instill confidence in the social sciences. Whether this is because of sloppy methodology, ideological infection, or other problems, the result is that even if there are right and wrong answers to many of our questions about human action, most social scientists are not yet in a position to find them. It is not that none of the work in social science is rigorous enough, but when policymakers (and sometimes even other researchers) are not sure which results are reliable, it drives down the status of the entire field. If medicine could break with its barbarous past, isn’t the same path open to the social sciences? For years, many have argued that if they could emulate the “scientific method” of the natural sciences, they too could become more scientific. But this simple advice faces several problems. Among the issues that plague contemporary social scientific research: Too much theory: A number of social scientific studies propose answers that have not been tested against evidence. The classic example here is neoclassical economics, where a number of simplifying assumptions — perfect rationality, perfect information — resulted in beautiful quantitative models that had little to do with actual human behavior. Lack of experimentation/data: Except for social psychology and the newly emerging field of behavioral economics, much of social science still does not rely on experimentation, even where it is possible. For example, it is sometimes offered as justification for putting sex offenders on a public database that doing so reduces the recidivism rate. This must be measured, though, against what the recidivism rate would have been absent the Sex Offender Registry Board (SORB), which is difficult to measure and has produced varying answers. This exacerbates the difficulty in (1), whereby favored theoretical explanations are accepted even when they have not been tested against any experimental evidence. Fuzzy concepts: Some social scientific studies can lead to misleading conclusions because of the use of “proxy” concepts for what one really wishes to measure. A recent example includes measuring “warmth” as a proxy for “trustworthiness,” in which researchers assumed — on the basis of studies which show that we are more likely to trust someone whom we perceive to be “on our side” — that perceptions of scientists as “cold” meant that they would be less trustworthy as well. But the two concepts may not be interchangeable. Ideological infection: This problem is rampant throughout the social sciences, especially on topics that are politically charged. Two ongoing examples are the bastardization of empirical work on the deterrence effect of capital punishment and the effectiveness of gun control on mitigating crime. If one knows in advance what one wants to find, one will likely find it. Cherry picking: The use of statistics allows multiple “degrees of freedom” to scientific researchers, but this is the most likely to be abused. In studies on immigration, for instance, a great deal of the difference between them is a result of alternative ways of counting the “costs” incurred by immigration. This is obviously also related to (4) above. If we know our conclusion, we may shop for the data to support it. Lack of data sharing: As the evolutionary biologist Robert Trivers reports in Psychology Today, there are numerous documented cases of researchers failing to share their data in psychological studies, despite a requirement from APA-sponsored journals to do so. When data were later analyzed, errors were found most commonly in the direction of the researcher’s hypothesis. Lack of replication: Psychology is undergoing a reproducibility crisis. One might validly argue that the initial finding that nearly two-thirds of psychology studies were irreproducible was overblown, but it is nonetheless shocking that most studies are not even attempted to be replicated. This can lead to difficulties, where errors can sneak through. Questionable causation: It is gospel in statistical research that “correlation does not equal causation,” yet some social scientific studies continue to highlight provocative results of questionable value. One recent sociological study, for instance, found that matriculating at a selective college was correlated with parental visitation at art museums, without explicitly suggesting that this was likely an artifact of parental income.
— Lee McIntyre To Fix the Social Sciences, Look to the “Dark Ages” of Medicine

A more plausible conception of race, one that is consistent with how careful philosophers and geneticists use the term, recognises that: When humans began leaving Africa around 75,000 years ago, they dispersed across a much greater range of environments than they had previously inhabited. The humans that settled in different geographic regions subsequently came under different selection pressures (e.g. temperature, seasonality, altitude). Natural barriers such as oceans (e.g. the Atlantic), deserts (e.g. the Sahara) and mountain ranges (e.g. the Himalayas) impeded gene flow between different populations for substantial periods of time. When there is limited gene flow between populations that have come under different selection pressures, we would expect them to gradually diverge from one another over via the processes of genetic drift and natural selection.

— Bo Winegard, Noah Carl Superior: The Return of Race Science—A Review