Justin’s Notes

The Danger of Making Equality an Empirical Claim

2026-07-20 · AI-generated insight

Gould states the uncomfortable premise plainly: human equality "is not given a priori. It is neither an ethical principle... It just worked out that way." Equality, on this view, is a finding — something science discovered, not something ethics stipulated. The other notes show both the power and the peril of building a moral order on that foundation.

The power first. Degler traces how Boas's culture concept — one man's empirical reframing of human difference — swept through the social sciences in a generation. Duedahl then shows the industrialization of that idea: UNESCO recruiting carefully-chosen scientists to issue authoritative statements, infiltrating national curricula, supplying expert witnesses whose testimony helped end American segregation. Because equality was framed as what the science says, it could travel through channels that pure moral exhortation could not — courtrooms, textbooks, international bodies. The empirical framing gave anti-racism institutional teeth.

But Warne's note exposes the bill that comes due. If equality is an empirical claim, it is hostage to evidence — and the temptation to manage the evidence becomes enormous. The Morton affair is almost a parable: Gould accused a 19th-century scientist of unconsciously fudging skull data to fit his racial biases, and anthropologists later argued that Gould had done precisely the same thing in the opposite direction. The man who insisted equality "just worked out that way" may have been quietly ensuring that it worked out that way in his tables.

Notice that Duedahl's UNESCO already contained this dynamic in embryo: the statements were authored by scientists selected partly for their conclusions, with dissenters admitted only once, in 1964. The campaign Boas began succeeded because it fused moral commitment with scientific authority — but that fusion means every empirical dispute becomes a moral emergency, and every researcher a potential partisan. Gould's own formulation names the trap he fell into: he acknowledged that "a hundred different and plausible scenarios" could have yielded inequality, which makes the data existentially load-bearing. A morality that would survive any finding has no reason to bend findings. One that wouldn't, does.

The unresolved question these notes pose together: can equal moral treatment be decoupled from empirical sameness — made an ethical principle after all — without losing the institutional force that the scientific framing gave it?

Woven from these notes

Until the 1890s Boas used the term as his fellow anthropologists did: as another word for civilization or “high culture.” Franz Boas’s exposition of the concept of culture as an alternative to race in accounting for differences among human groups was a genuine seminal contribution. The idea not only conquered his own field of anthropolgy but spread as well to other social science disciplines. The diffusion was remarkably rapid. Again and again in the early years of the new century American social scientists outside of anthropology testified to the influence of his writings on their conception of human nature and the place of biology or race within it.
— Carl Degler In Search of Human Nature: The Decline and Revival of Darwinism in American Social Thought
In 1997, Akira Iriye characterized UNESCO as a hub for cultural internationalism in the wake of World War II, and recent research has confirmed the impression of the organization as an excellent prism reflecting ways of thinking that became popular on a global scale and that it has sometimes even served as the initiating and powerful promotor of concepts that became popular and widely used, such as ‘world heritage’ and ‘global citizenship’. In this article, I have sought to demonstrate another example of the proactive role of UNESCO. The articles has focused on the organization’sefforts to launch a program supposed to combat racial inequality, which is not mentioned by Iriye, but which according to other scholars, placed the organization in the middle of a dispute in international scientific circles over the correct definition of the concept of race. Thus, in the article I have combined Iriye’s focus on the importance of cultural internationalism for global peace-making and UNESCO’s important role with the studies of the organization’s work within the field of race as well as my archival findings in order to draw a conclusion as to whether its showdown with the race concept had a global impact. What we see is that, from 1950 to 1967, UNESCO managed to issue four statements of race formulated by some of the world’s leading yet simultaneously carefully-chosen scientists, most Western and all stressing human equality. The organization’s preference for social scientists rather than physical anthropologists at the same time made the organization a centre of a dispute organized around the question of whether the natural or social sciences should take precedence in determining the origins of human difference, of social division, and the attribution of value. Outside of UNESCO headquarters, the statements for the same reasons caused severe criticism in a time still characterized by European colonialism, American segregation, and South African apartheid policies. Only on one occasion, in 1964, was a researcher chosen despite being overtly critical towards the organization’s work and only in 1967 could the panel of scientists be characterized as truly global in its scope and composition. UNESCO also issued a series of publications that were able to infiltrate national educational systems and which represented a steady bombardment of publications that at least physical anthropologists had to deal with. Critique of their content nonetheless only added to public awareness of the organization’s work. As the cases on segregation reached the U.S. Supreme Court, the outcome of UNESCO’s race program would also play a role. This article shows that experts affiliated with the organization were on several occasions brought in as expert witnesses and that the statements on race highlighted as the newest available research, paving the 16 P. DUEDAHL way towards the eradication of state-approved segregation in the U.S., whereas South Africa chose to withdraw from UNESCO. In sum, the statements and the authority with which the experts spoke had an impact and came to play a major part in imposing the new post-war view of man in several countries. However, it is only after 1960 that UNESCO’s cultural internationalism within the field of race can be said to focus on racism as a problem that had to be solved on a global scale. The main reasons for this was that discussions within academic circles ahead of UNESCO’s race efforts had mainly been going on among Western scholars, that UNESCO failed to locate non-Western scholars, and that dealing with racism was perceived as most urgent in the U.S. and South Africa. Also the expensiveness of translating UNESCO’s findings into all languages, the difficulties of promoting the content in a way that would have an impact on a larger group of people, and the lack of control over the many national environments that received and were supposed to distribute news from UNESCO made a difference. Only after a range of anti-Semitic incidents, the demands of a number of new Asian and African member states, and pressure from the UN, did the initiative gradually change. Altogether, it proved to be more difficult and to take a considerably longer time than initially imagined by UNESCO to turn a few scholar’s idea of race into one with a truly global appeal and impact.
— Poul Duedahl Changing the Concept of Race: On UNESCO and Cultural Internationalism
Equality [of the races] is not given a priori. It is neither an ethical principle (though equal treatment may be) nor a statement about norms of social action. It just worked out that way. A hundred different and plausible scenarios for human history would have yielded other results (and moral dilemmas of enormous magnitude). They didn't happen.
— Gould
Many scholars have criticized The Mismeasure of Man periodically throughout its 38-year history. For example, James T. Sanders stated that Gould’s attempt to link his argument to anti-racism was a ploy to smear intelligence scholars and Gould’s enemies as evil people. Arthur Jensen argued in 1982 that Gould misrepresented Jensen’s ideas and often demolished strawmen that no intelligence scholar believes, including the boogeyman of “biological determinism.” John Carroll showed that Gould understood neither the purpose nor interpretation of factor analysis (a statistical procedure often used to evaluate data from psychological tests) and that Gould’s attacks on factor analysis do nothing to alter the importance of intelligence tests, nor the mass of evidence—impossible to dispute—that they predict real-life outcomes. Most criticism of The Mismeasure of Man was confined to the recherché world of psychologists who study intelligence. However, a new debate opened up in 2011 when a team of anthropologists argued that Gould’s analysis of the data on cranium measurements from 19th century scientist Samuel George Morton was flawed. Gould cast Morton as a racist who fudged his data to match his beliefs about white racial superiority because of a supposed larger skull capacity. Instead, the anthropologists argued, it was Gould who manipulated the data to support his biases. This ignited a series of follow-up articles in the scholarly literature by authors taking a variety of positions regarding Morton’s data and Gould’s interpretations. Weisberg believed that the re-analysis was flawed and Gould was mostly correct. Kaplan and his colleagues claimed that Morton’s interpretations were flawed, but that Gould was incorrect in believing that he could discern Morton’s actions and motivations. Finally, Mitchell believed that Morton’s data were accurate and that the interpretations were colored by the racism of the era, but the claim that Morton subtly manipulated the data was a fiction created by Gould.
— Russell T. Warne The Mismeasurements of Stephen Jay Gould