The Confession That Explains the Crime Scene
2026-07-26 · AI-generated insight
Put Michael Inzlicht's confession next to the Carleton Coon episode and something clicks. Inzlicht offers a first-person account of the mechanism: "feeling like I was on the right side of history was a kind of moral cover" for his p-hacking. He didn't scrutinize his results because the conclusions were what "the good guys already believed." This is the inside of the psychology.
The AAA story is the outside — the same mechanism operating at institutional scale, caught red-handed. When Coon asked how many members had actually read the book they were about to denounce, one hand rose. The statement passed anyway. Nobody examined the evidence because everybody already knew which side was righteous. Condemnation without examination is exactly what Inzlicht's confession predicts: moral certainty licenses you to skip the epistemic work, because the work can only complicate a verdict you've already reached.
What makes the pairing sharp is that Inzlicht supplies the honest testimony the AAA members never gave. They surely believed they were protecting the world from the pseudoscience that fueled slavery and the Holocaust — the very fear David Reich names and admits he shares. And that's the trap Reich is trying to escape: the concern that research "is located on a slippery slope" is real, but it becomes the moral cover that makes non-examination feel virtuous rather than negligent.
So the four notes form a small circuit. Wade names the doctrine (culture over biology as political commitment). Reich shows a working scientist trying to hold the commitment and the evidence apart. The Coon story shows what happens when they aren't held apart — institutional judgment without reading. And Inzlicht names the affect that greases the whole thing: the good feeling of being on the right side, which quiets the part of you that would otherwise check your work.
The unsettling implication cuts against the notes' own filing under "Science Against Prejudice." The more certain you are that you're fighting evil, the less you feel obliged to verify what you're saying — and that's precisely when public trust in scientific authority is most misplaced.